


Shantung, Grab Bag of History, Once More in Dispute



Along the shores of Tsingtau, the former German city in the province of Shantung, showing hotels, postoffice, railway board administration office and customs house

Mr. Moore, recently New York Tribune correspondent accredited to the peace conference, is especially fitted to discuss the problem of Shantung. He spent nearly six years in China, five of them as correspondent of The Associated Press, at one of the most critical periods of China's recent history. He saw and reported to the American press in 1911 and 1912 how China became what is called a republic, had charge of the war correspondents who reported the Tsingtau campaign by which the Japanese, in 1914, after landing on Chinese territory, captured the German forces and fortifications on the Shantung coast. In 1915 he reported one of the most dramatic political events in the recent history of the Far East, the secret attempt of Japan to impose the historical Twenty-one Demands on China.

By Frederick Moore

WHAT is the problem of Shantung, over which, alone of all the territorial settlements comprised in the vast treaty of peace with Germany, the Senate takes serious issue with the President and the Allied statesmen of Europe?

Except in missionary circles and among a few consuls and diplomats who have represented the United States in the Far East, there is little known in this country about Shantung other than that the province produces a peculiar quality of raw silk that bears its name—Shantung silk, or pongee. Yet this remote Chinese province has become the subject of grave controversy between this country and Japan.

What is Shantung and why should this primitive province of backward China be regarded in the United States as the one bad territorial error of the President in making peace? Shantung is one of China's most important provinces. It is about the size of the state of Illinois, with 55,970 square miles of territory and about forty million inhabitants. No census has ever been taken anywhere in China, so that the exact population of a province or even of the city of Peking, the capital of the country, is unknown. Shantung is on the coast,

most of the province being a peninsula jutting out into the Yellow Sea in the direction of Korea.

Strategically Important

Shantung is strategically important because of its geographical position, immediately south of Port Arthur, and because it is the province immediately adjacent to Chi-li province, in which the Chinese capital is located. Through the province of Shantung the only railway artery connecting Peking with Shanghai, the principal Chinese seaport, runs approximately north and south; and connecting with this trunk line at Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, is the German-built line to the former German port and fortress of Tsingtau in the district and on the little bay called Kiaochow.

It is obvious why the Japanese, who have always looked with suspicion and distrust on the encroachments of the European nations in China, have seized the present opportunity to rid their giant but feeble neighbor of the Germans, whom China herself neither would nor could put out. It is Japan's policy—for selfish purposes, unquestionably, but very human ones—to protect China from further white aggression, because of the danger of that aggression to Japan; and the only way the Japanese feel they can insure their safety is by laying prior claim

to various Chinese provinces and by profiting by the vast natural wealth which the Chinese themselves do not exploit.

On the other hand, the Chinese, who regard the Japanese with a contempt inherited from times when Chinese civilization ranked first in the world, resent the assumption of protectorate which the Japanese are steadily attempting to impose upon them.

The Japanese have become powerful by adopting European methods and making personal sacrifices for their country, such as the Chinese do not make, but this modern development has only intensified the dislike the Chinese bear them. Each regards itself as a greatly superior race, and the Chinese prefer and tolerate European incursions—having even in the past invited Europeans and Americans—for the purpose of defeating the objects of the Japanese.

"Great Friendly People"

The Japanese used to call us the Great Friendly People. We were among the first to recognize their right to self-determination within their own borders and to agree to a termination of the privileged position which white men held upon their islands.

After several quick and costly defeats at the hands of the United States and European powers and the payment of heavy indemnities during the latter half of the last century the Japanese realized the necessity of adopting Western methods, and their first modern warships were purchased from this country, old Civil War cruisers. Within a comparatively short time the Japanese had possessed themselves of modern armament, but they then began to realize that the poverty of their rocky islands was such that they would be unable to defend themselves and at the same time find outlets for their

surplus population unless they controlled territories and natural resources abroad. The Koreans and Chinese had not the power to restrict their approach in the way that the United States and the British Pacific colonies have seen fit to do so those Asiatic territories became the Japanese objectives.

China at first attempted to resist, disputing, a quarter of a century ago, the interference of Japan in Korea, which kingdom the Chinese had long claimed as a dependency, though with as shadowy an excuse as they now claim authority over Tibet and Mongolia. The China-Japanese war of 1894 resulted in the quick defeat of the Colossus, the modern-trained Japanese forces sweeping the Chinese rabble before them almost as rapidly as they could advance. The Japanese planned not only to rid Korea of the Chinese, but to establish themselves also in Port Arthur, the strategic naval base which the approaching Russians already showed signs of coveting. But three of the European powers—Russia, France and Germany—"advised" the Tokio government in unmistakable terms that it would be wise to withdraw.

The Japanese complied, but not without anticipating their next and greater struggle—that with Russia. To an amazing degree the Japanese had begun to comprehend international matters that were so new to them. To Europe the millions of soldiers of the Czar were a terror from which the greatest nations had shrunk. Russia, it will be remembered, had long been regarded by Great Britain as her first menace to her existence. But the men who in their youth had worn skirts and long queues, who daintily fanned themselves and drank tea from delicate cups, had gone abroad throughout the world and made their own estimate of other men, their laws, religions and machines, and had determined that the Great Bear that lay across Europe and Asia was by no means the formidable power that European nations believed.

They estimated correctly, however, that he could muster friends and allies, and they found also that there were rivals with opposing interests among the European nations, and they deemed

it necessary formally to obtain the support of at least one great power hostile to Russia. They found that ally in Great Britain, forming an alliance early in the century which has lasted down to the present day.

The first treaty with Great Britain provided for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Korea as well as that of China, but the clause was dropped in renewals of the treaty when the march of events in East Asia became obvious. The treaty has been modified several times to meet the changing status of Oriental conditions, for it was originally designed to keep the field clear for Japan in meeting the thrust from Russia down into China and Korea, a menace that no longer exists.

Russia in the nineties was completing the Transsiberian railway across Manchuria, the northern province of China. Hardly had the Japanese withdrawn from the southern section of Manchuria at the insistence of Russia, France and Germany than the Czar's ministers, by connivance with the arch-traitor, Li Hung Chang, took possession of the peninsula of Liaotung by lease for twenty-five years, and began to extend a branch of the Siberian road from Harbin, on the Siberian peninsula.

The "Great Period"

This was the beginning of the succession of European "grabs" that became notorious at the time of our difficulties and war with Spain. Taking as an excuse the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, the Kaiser's government followed that of Russia (in 1905) with the seizure of the harbor of Kiaochow, including the port of Tsingtau, where a naval base was established and fortress erected under a ninety-nine-year lease extorted from the Chinese. It was then deemed likewise that the British government fit to grant the British a concession at Wei-Hai-Wei, on the northern shore of the Shantung peninsula.

It was this series of incursions that alarmed the Chinese and caused them two years later (in 1900) to launch the stupid Boxer rising, which cost

them heavily, further impaired their independence and still failed to teach them the lesson that the Japanese had learned so readily, namely, that a nation must take care of its own integrity and keep abreast of modern development.

Though the Japanese took part with the allies of that date in the march to the relief of the besieged legations in Peking, they nevertheless looked with no ease of spirit at the encroachments of the white races in Eastern Asia, for the French, too, had extended their possessions and "sphere of influence" from Indo-China up to the southern provinces of China proper.

Up to the beginning of the present war the game of the European nations appeared to the Japanese to be one of selfish national rivalry and constant striving for power, strategic position and natural resources; and when the great struggle began in Europe in 1914 the Okuma government, then in power in Tokio, followed this European example. An ultimatum was sent to Germany, couched in terms similar to that in which the Germans had participated with the French and Russians in requiring Japan, twenty years previously, to withdraw from Liaotung.

As the latest treaty of alliance with Great Britain provided for Japan's participation in the war only in the Asiatic sphere, Japan demanded that Germany withdraw from Tsingtau, her Eastern naval base. There were evidences at that early date that the British and Count Okuma's government were not upon the closest understanding; that the Japanese were acting to an extent independently.

Berlin ignored the Japanese summons, wherefore the Japanese blockaded Kiaochow Bay, landed forces on the northern shore of Shantung, marched them across that neck of the Chinese peninsula, despite the Chinese protest, and, after investing the German fortress, stormed it and captured the garrison of 3,000 men, who were taken to Japan and interned for the duration of the war.

In the East there was then nothing to stay Japan, the great powers of Europe were all involved in war, and the United States was regarded as determined to follow a policy of non-interference in foreign affairs. President Wilson had publicly stated that

the war in Europe was none of America's business. To Count Okuma, an exceedingly crafty statesman, the situation appeared to be, as he was credited with stating, "the opportunity of ten thousand years"—an Oriental phrase meaning eternity.

What has been acknowledged by many Japanese as the greatest blunder one of their administrations has ever made was the attempt that came in 1915 to obtain control of China. Contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Japanese treaty with Great Britain, the Tokio government presented a series of twenty-one demands to China, requiring concessions of a far-reaching character in Manchuria, Shantung, Fukien, in the Yangtze River valley, and even in Peking, over the central government itself.

The preamble of the Anglo-Japanese alliance provides for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of China, and one of the clauses pledges either party to inform the other if any transgression is perceived. Here the Japanese were themselves the aggressors, yet they officially denied for several months the accuracy of the statements given out by the Chinese—who had no other defence but to appeal to public opinion throughout the world. While attempting to take control of the Chinese army and encroaching upon other branches of China's internal administration, the venerable Japanese court persistently reassured the Western world with promises to return Tsingtau to full Chinese sovereignty.

Group V Withdrawn

Largely because of the storm of protest that developed in the British and American press, the Japanese Foreign Office finally withdrew what was known as Group V of the demands, which affected the central administration of China, though by moving military forces into Shantung and Manchuria and threatening to employ them they obtained the provincial concessions they demanded, which were of enormous political, strategic and commercial value, and gave them special privileges beyond those which any European power or the United States possesses to-day.

The Chinese granted these concessions and signed the treaties covering

them in May, 1915. Later they desired to enter the war, not that they could give any great military help to the Allies or had any grievance against Germany, but in order to obtain a place at the peace table, where they hoped to recover by diplomacy a measure of the losses they had suffered because of military inefficiency. But the Japanese government persistently prevented China entering the war until after the hard pressed Allies had given pledges to Japan that they would recognize Japan's claims to the transfer of Germany's concessions and possessions in Tsingtau and along the railway in Shantung.

When President Wilson finally broke off relations with Germany and sent broadcast invitations to the various neutrals to do likewise the Chinese then mustered sufficient courage to comply, and actually declared war before the President asked Congress to recognize that a state of war existed. The American Minister in Peking, Paul S. Reinsch, a man of German origin and to a large extent sympathy, had been hostile to the Japanese for the long period of his tenure in the American Legation, and it is said, perhaps correctly, that he promised American support to China at the peace table.

In Paris the Chinese delegation thought, up to the day President Wilson made his decision, that he would insist that the German concessions and possessions (which included railways and cables) should be returned direct to China; but the President finally agreed that, as the Japanese contended, unless the European powers and America were willing likewise to denounce all the treaties they had imposed on China by force of arms Japan could not be required to do so.

The finished clauses of the peace treaty with Germany relating to Shantung transfer the German lease at Kiaochow and the German railways, cables, etc., to Japan, and Japanese statesmen have promised by word of mouth, in a gentleman's agreement, as it were, to return Tsingtau to China according to the China-Japan treaties of 1915, which stipulate that China shall open the port to the commerce of all nations and grant Japan a trading concession or settlement at that port.

Another Chapter in Germany's Confession of Turkish Guilt

NO MORE powerful indictment of Turkey's crimes in Armenia appeared during the war than that presented by a German writer, Dr. Johannes Lepsius, chairman of the German Orient Mission and the German-Armenian Society. Dr. Lepsius has investigated the Armenian persecutions on the spot and incorporated his findings in a report entitled, "Die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei," published secretly at Potsdam in 1916. Dr. Lepsius expressly corroborates the testimony of American consuls and missionaries and indorses the report published by the Bryce committee. He charges the responsibility for the Armenian horrors outright to the Turkish government, declaring that the extermination of the Armenian nation was decided upon at Constantinople as a matter of policy. The author's silence on the alleged efforts of the German government to stop the persecutions and his condemnation of the German censorship which throughout withheld the truth from the German public, constitute an implicit admission of Germany's guilt in the matter.

In two preceding articles we have reproduced in substance Dr. Lepsius's narrative of the horrors themselves and his analysis of the attitude of the Young Turks.

The concluding article, printed below, gives Dr. Lepsius's views as to the effects of the persecutions on Turkey's economic status.

By Eugene S. Bagger

"TURKEY must be an essentially Moslem country. Moslem ideas and Moslem influence must predominate. All other religious propaganda must be suppressed. The existence of the empire depends on the strength of the Young Turk party and on the suppression of all antagonistic ideas."

The above passage is quoted by Dr. Lepsius from a resolution adopted in 1911 by the convention of the Young Turk party at Salonica. It contains, according to the German writer, the ideological background of the policy which culminated in the extermination of the Armenian people.

"The programme of the (Young Turk) government was determined by two leading considerations," Dr. Lepsius says in another place. "First, the centralistic idea, which postulated

for the Turkish race not merely hegemony (Vorherrschaft) but exclusive mastery (Alleinherrschaft). In the Empire, was to be executed in all its implications. Second, the Empire was to be built upon purely Islamicistic basis. Turkish nationalism and the Pan-Islamic idea excluded in advance the enfranchisement of the different nationalities and denominations of the Empire."

"A Turkish Cabinet minister is reported to have said in the course of the war: 'By the end of the war there will be no Christians left in Constantinople.' . . . An under-secretary of the Department of Justice said to an Armenian: 'There is no room both for you and for ourselves in the empire, and a failure on our part to take advantage of the present situation and get rid of you would be irresponsible levity.' Members of the Young Turk committee said quite openly that all 'strangers had to vanish from the empire—first the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Jews and finally the Europeans.'"

"A Turkish Cabinet minister boasted

that he could accomplish in three years what it took across in thirty weeks that which Abdul Hamid had years," to wit, the extermination of the Armenians. "The argument that with the few guilty ones an immense number of innocent were to suffer was met by a Turkish army officer with the following remark: 'The same question was put by some one to our Prophet Mahomet—God's peace be with him—and he answered: 'If a flea bites you would you not kill all fleas?'"

The author does not hesitate to proclaim his conviction that by uprooting the most progressive and best gifted element of the population the Turkish government pushed the empire to the verge of economic ruin. He says:

"The annihilation of the Armenian people means not merely the extinction of 10 to 25 per cent of the population in Anatolia, but, what weighs more heavily, the elimination of the culturally most valuable and economically most developed element of the population."

Dr. Lepsius defends the Armenians against certain slanderous allegations as to their honesty and trustworthiness which were circulated in the German press by way of explaining the Turkish attitude.

"As the entire export and import trade is divided between Greeks, Armenians and Jews, and as the Turk himself never rises above the stage of retail trade and remains, on the whole and apart from the bureaucratic caste, in the peasant class, the aversion of Turks to Armenians, Greeks and Jews, inasmuch as not of a religious character, must be considered as the outcome of a natural antagonism between natural and money economy, between primitive agrarian culture and incipient industrialization."

"Those German correspondents who constantly refer to the Armenians as crooks and exploiters (these are the same gentlemen whose vocabulary for describing Serbians was limited to the epithet 'cattle thieves') evince thereby



Refugees brought to America on relief ship sent over by Armenian Syrian Committee

only their own ignorance and lack of culture. Eighty per cent of the Armenian population of Turkey consisted of peasants; the number of city dwellers was about equally divided between commerce on the one hand and the liberal professions and various handicrafts on the other.

"Neither is religion an adequate explanation of Turkish inferiority in the mercantile field. In competition with Armenians and Greeks, Persians and Arabs (Moslems themselves) always hold their own, inasmuch as they are not handicapped by ignorance of language."

Germany's trade relations with the Armenian, Greek and Jewish firms in the Turkish empire were based on a system of long-term credits. Dr. Lepsius explains. This is in contrast to the English custom of granting credits for very short terms only. "In spite of the fact," he writes, "that these Armenian, Greek and Jewish firms have to sell on the basis of six or nine months' credit and are seldom if ever

able to collect within a year, with insignificant exceptions they have always lived up to their obligations to German creditors. The credit system underlying this import trade results in the fact that all the time the Turkish retailer and consumer owe considerable sums to the importers, so that the Armenians, Greeks and Jews are always creditors and the Turks always debtors. This inevitable relationship is felt by the Turk (who is apt to forget that he has received goods for the money he owes) as a state of dependence, and leads him to the notion that the annihilation of the Christian and Jewish commerce would rid him of his indebtedness and leave him better off financially."

"However, it is not only the Armenian merchant, who simply disappears from the scene, that is hit by the consequences of a policy which encourages this delusion, but also the German and Austrian exporters and the banks interested in export trade. I have before me the customers' list of a single im-

porter in Constantinople who gets his supplies principally from Germany and Austria. The outstanding claims of the firm amount at present to 13,922 Turkish pounds (about \$56,000), owed by 378 clients in forty-two cities of the interior. These claims are now, owing to the deportation of Armenians, uncollectible. The 378 customers, plus their employments and property, have simply disappeared off the face of the earth. Those who survive are at present beggars somewhere on the edge of the Arabian desert."

According to Dr. Lepsius, it is chiefly the import trade of Turkey that is concentrated in the hands of Armenians, while the exports are mainly controlled by Greeks. He estimated that at least 60 per cent of the entire import trade, 40 per cent of the exports and at least 80 per cent of the trade in the interior was held by Armenians.

The significance of the Armenian importing firms becomes evident only if we consider that before the war Turkey had practically not a single manufacturing establishment, and every description of goods and articles of consumption had to be imported from Europe. "Look here," a Turk said to Dr. Lepsius, "everything I wear except my beard comes from Frangistan (Europe). But for these Franghi (Europeans) we should be obliged to go about naked like our ancestors Adam and Eve."

"From the entire Armenian commerce of Turkey all that survived is a few firms in Constantinople and Smyrna, as these cities have, on the whole, been spared from deportations. All the trade in the interior, with its stocks of wares and accumulated values and, what is worse, with all the values of creative energy, has been annihilated."

"It is a doubtful gain if the entire property of the Armenian populace in the interior (houses, real estate, stocks of wares, furnishings, foodstuffs down to clothing and shoes, all except the belongings of Armenians forcibly converted to Islam) is expropriated by the Turkish government and distributed at low prices or free of charge among the Turkish and Kurdish population. No

bleeding can attach to this mass plunder which is without a parallel in history and which was thinkable only under a Turkish regime.

"A person does not become a business man by slaying one. Nobody learns a trade by destroying its tools. A thinly populated country will not be rendered more productive by the extermination of its most industrious inhabitants."

"The economic damage, which is by no means limited to the immediate losses, huge as they are, but which will be revealed to its full extent only later, will have to be borne by Germany and Austria in the first place."

And here, inadvertently, it would seem, Dr. Lepsius makes an important admission. The world had occasion to listen to tales of the enthusiasm with which the entire Turkish people went into the "holy war" against the infidels. The war, it was said, was hailed by the Turkish masses as the great opportunity of Moslem revival, as the new dawn of Ottoman strength and grandeur. In a word, the Turkish, or rather the German, press represented the war, from the Turkish point of view, as the Ottoman equivalent of "Der Tag."

Maybe this was the view taken of the struggle by the Young Turk intellectuals of Constantinople. It was not the view taken by the Turkish masses, if Dr. Lepsius is right. Note his version: "Perhaps the popularity of an unpopular war was enhanced in the eyes of the Turkish mob by the chance to rob and annihilate the non-Mahomedan populace, first of all the Armenians, then Syrians, Greeks, Maronites and Jews. Thoughtful Mahomedans, however, will, in view of the losses suffered by this country, most sincerely deplore the economic ruin of Turkey and will reach the verdict that the Turkish government has lost immensely more through the domestic warfare than it could ever hope to gain by a victory abroad."

In regard to the question of enlightening the German public about the Armenian horrors, Dr. Lepsius does not attempt to conceal the fact that

the German press hoodwinked its own readers by limiting itself to the publication of mendacious Turkish official bulletins. On the other hand, he points out that this was due mainly to the rigid censorship exercised by the German government. By defending the German newspaper press Dr. Lepsius thus indicts the German government. The following passage is highly illuminating:

"In Germany, also, when the unjustified excitement over the American reports had calmed down—these reports were, in the meantime, fully confirmed through German sources—the facts began to be circulated in secret. The better class press, which even during the war remained conscious of its responsibility toward its public, preferred, with few exceptions, to keep silent altogether on the Armenian question, as the censorship could not permit, out of regard for Turkey, the public discussion of the situation."

However, Dr. Lepsius is unable to deny that the Turkish presentation of the events found ready credence in the German press: "Naturally, the German press was glad to take cognizance of these assurances of an allied government and treated them with due (1) confidence."

The result was, according to the German writer, that when the first American reports were published, in August and September, 1915, the German newspapers refused to credit them and charged American bluff. Some even insisted on branding the American reports as "products of the English lie factory." Dr. Lepsius remarks: "Had the reports been known in full, such accusations would have been omitted. The English reports confined themselves exclusively to the reproduction of American sources." He continues: "The American reports were published by a committee composed of men who inspired the greatest confidence even in Germany. The reports contain nothing but communications from eyewitnesses, chiefly consuls and missionaries, and are limited to statements of fact, without going into a discussion of the political side of the matter."